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Key Events 
On September 20, 2018 the Canadian Association for Security and 
Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Vancouver hosted its eighth roundtable 
meeting which covered “Lesson Learned in Intelligence Analysis.” The 
following presentation was hosted by John Pyrik, a former intelligence 
officer, and the first analytical methodologist for the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS). The subsequent roundtable discussion 
focused on examining the notion of whether Canada has been 
excessively lenient towards individuals who have been convicted of 
espionage, with particular regards to the selling of classified 
information. 
Nature of Discussion 
The presentation focused on first defining intelligence and what are the 
basic requirements of obtaining intelligence. Which continued to an 
examination of intelligence failures, such as the Cuban missile crisis, the 
Iranian revolution, and the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, the importance of 
analysists using structured analytical techniques when producing 
intelligence products was also discussed. With a particular focus on how 
these techniques can potentially improve the quality of intelligence 
analysis. Furthermore, the potentially increased role of AI in intelligence 
collection and analysis, and the fundamental importance of the human 
analyst was also covered in the presentation. 
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Background 
The presentation began with a general introduction asking, what is 
intelligence? Despite the term intelligence being widely used, it was 
explained the police, military and national intelligence services will have 
difference uses for intelligence, and thus will define intelligence 
differently. 
Therefore, the term intelligence, is without a universally accepted 
definition. Further commenting that the term is occasionally used to 
refer to what could be more accurately described as information or facts. 
While in other instances the term is used to refer to the analysis of 
information that has been processed into a final intelligence product. 
Intelligence was described as being the final derived output, from an 
initial input of raw data, which is then processed in several stages. 
Thereby defining intelligence in accordance with the latter 
understanding of what is meant by the term, to provide the appropriate 
context of how the term would be used in the presentation. 
Several historical instances of intelligence failure were mentioned. In 
addition to failures of collection and analysis, poor communication was 
identified between agencies, a lack of client receptivity and failures of 
policy as key factors which may lead to an intelligence failure. The first 
example was the failure to predict the 1979 Iranian revolution, described 
as a failure of intelligence collection. Since a narrow range of sources 
were used, thus creating an inaccurate perception of the political 
situation in Iran. 
When discussing the Cuban missile crisis, it could be argued that a lack 
of proper collection in combination with failures of analysis led to the 
resulting surprise when the missiles were discovered in Cuba. Since 
inadequate collection efforts were compounded by a biased perception 
of what actions and risks the Soviet Union would be willing to take. 
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The September 11th attacks were presented as an example of an 
intelligence failure resulting from poor communication. Although there 
was a large amount of pertinent information that was known, this 
information was not shared. This was described as an “unknown 
known”, in reference to the former United States Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld. Meaning that since this information was not shared 
or distributed properly, it could not be used effectively and was thus not 
accounted, therefore, effectively remained “unknown”. 
Distinction was drawn between failures of poor intelligence and of poor 
response by those acting on the intelligence that has been provided. 
Noting that even with good intelligence, the risk of an operational failure 
remains. Therefore, even the best intelligence cannot guarantee 
operational success. 
On the topic of improving intelligence analysis, two categorizations of 
the methods by which intelligence analysis could be improved were 
discussed. One set of methods would be through “learning and sharing.” 
Where analysts would engage in seminars and mentoring session, in 
order to improve their tradecraft. Furthermore, the sharing of 
information through an internal wiki could also be beneficial to 
accomplishing this goal. 
The second set of methods were of a structural nature, involving the 
development of a set of standards and best practices as a mean to 
improve analytical tradecraft. This would involve formalizing what a 
good assessment should look like and implement institutional 
mechanisms for reviewing assessments. Moreover, the employment of a 
structural analytics methodologist, to directly advise and assist analysts 
with the use of structured analytic techniques. 
To conclude, there are limitations to relying on structured analytic 
techniques to improve the quality of analysis. Noting that there is a 
limited understanding to the overall effectiveness of these techniques in 
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actually achieving this goal. With the additional problem of convincing 
analysis to further incorporate structured analytic techniques into their 
assessments; it should also be noted that an extract cost-benefit analysis 
of using structured analytic techniques has yet to be determined. 
Key Points of Discussion 
- It was argued that the traditional approach of eliminating all bias 
from an assessment may not be entirely correct. Arguably, the mere 
presence of bias is not always bad, and thus a distinction can 
therefore be drawn between good biases and bad biases. A group of 
individuals that are influenced by their bias by constantly leaning 
towards the believed correct answer were referred to as “super-
forecasters.” They challenge the notion that the best method for 
improving intelligence analysis is specifically by removing the 
analyst’s biases from an assessment. 
- Since the AI will be able to identify correlations, a human analyst 
will be required to examine those correlation and determine their 
validity. The use of AI and machine learning systems will eventually 
provide analysist with useful tools to generate better intelligence 
assessments. However, it could be argued that these systems will not 
replace the analysts themselves as the final assessment will still 
require a measure of human oversight. 
- It was noted that a significant amount of work will need to be done 
in order to convert the necessary data, in to a machine-readable form. 
So that this data, could be at least in principle, be properly analysed 
by an AI program. The need for more precise database coding 
requirements to be created, as well as a large volume of none-digital 
based sources and files were cited as potential challenges to 
accomplishing this goal. Therefore, it was argued that if it could not 
be fully determined that an AI would be able to provide an accurate 
analysis, without human oversight, then the cost may not be justified. 
CASIS-Vancouver 
 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 
Volume 1, Issue 2 
 
 
Page 5 
- Intelligence failures may have distinct causes, which may require 
different solutions to properly address. For example, by potentially 
solving problems relating to the analysis of intelligence by 
incorporating the use of structured analytic techniques, problems 
such as collection, improper communication, or client receptivity 
may still remain. 
- Structured analytic techniques can in principle be used to improve 
intelligence analysis. However, these techniques have not always 
been eagerly adopted by analysts, and their effectiveness is not 
guaranteed. 
West Coast Perspectives 
- The notion of lenience towards individuals convicted of espionage, 
with a specific reference to Jeffrey Delisle and whether this could 
create a security risk was discussed. It was noted that despite the 
extent of Delisle’s crimes, he had been granted parole less than half 
way into his sentence. Some in attendance held the opinion that since 
Delisle would never hold a security clearance again, he was 
therefore, no longer a security risk. Thus, continued imprisonment 
would not be necessary since the risk of Delisle reoffending was 
non-existent. 
- Some addressed that a severe punishment as a means of deterrence 
was not an effective measure in practice. Thus, other than to mitigate 
the potential risk of reoffending, it is possible that the absolute 
requirement for an individual to serve an extensive sentence in this 
context would be unnecessary. 
- It was also argued that the nature of the crimes committed by Delisle, 
were severe enough to warrant further imprisonment. With a 
comparison being made between Delisle’s actions and committing 
first-degree murder. This comparison was due to the potential harm 
that may have been caused by revealing classified information to a 
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foreign nation. Therefore, the need for Delisle’s continued 
imprisonment could be view as serving principles of justice, rather 
than any implications directly pertaining to deterrence. 
- It was noted that there may be ethical concerns regarding how the 
data gathered by focusing on particular identity or ethnic group 
would in turn be used. With the practical difficulties of gaining the 
cooperation of certain groups, and properly accounting for the 
unique concerns of each group were also discussed. 
- A potential alternative approach discussed is the increased recruiting 
of minority groups, in order to allow for more diverse perspectives 
to be taken into consideration. However, a counter argument that was 
raised to the utility of this approach, was that organizations such as 
CSIS may have prevailing norms, which in practice may prevent 
these perspectives from being heard. Minority groups may conform 
to these norms, therefore, limiting the extent that the perspective of 
minority groups will be properly represented, despite increased 
recruiting efforts. 
Key Takeaways 
- Structured analytic techniques can in principle be used to improve 
intelligence analysis. However, these techniques have not always 
been eagerly adopted by analysts, and their effectiveness is not 
guaranteed. 
- Intelligence failures may have distinct causes, which may require 
different solutions to properly addresses. For example, by potentially 
solving problems relating to the proper analysis of intelligence by 
incorporating the use of structured analytic techniques, the further 
problems of collection or problems involving a lack of proper 
communication or client still remain. 
- The exact role of AI in furthering the practice of intelligence analysis 
at this time is unclear. As the concerns involving the need for human 
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oversight, and the work still required for the proper implementation 
of an AI analysis system still need to be addressed. 
- The issue of whether lenience towards those convicted of espionage 
creates a security risk generated a debate over the utility of 
deterrence for preventing future crimes of this nature. With strong 
opinions being presented on both sides of the debate. 
- The presence of curtain norms in organizations such as CSIS, may 
limit the extent that minority opinions can be taken into account, and 
the extent that bias can be addressed.
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